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Abstract. We consider a problem at the intersection of distributed com-
puting and game theory, namely: Is it possible to achieve the “windfall
of malice” even without the actual presence of malicious players? Our
answer to this question is “Yes and No”. Our positive result is that for
the virus inoculation game, it is possible to achieve the windfall of malice
by use of a mediator. Our negative result is that for symmetric conges-
tion games that are known to have a windfall of malice, it is not possible
to design a mediator that achieves this windfall. In proving these two
results, we develop novel techniques for mediator design that we believe
will be helpful for creating non-trivial mediators to improve social welfare
in a large class of games.
1 Introduction
Recent results show that malicious players in a game may, counter-intuitively,
improve social welfare [7,4,9]. For example, in [7] it is showed that for a virus
inoculation game, the existence of malicious players will actually lead to bet-
ter social welfare for the remaining players than if such malicious players are
absent.This improvement in the social welfare with malicious players has been
referred to as the “windfall of malice” [4]. The existence of the windfall of malice
for some games leads to an intriguing question: Can we achieve the windfall of
malice even without the actual presence of malicious players?
We show that the answer to the previous question is sometimes “Yes”. How
do we achieve the beneﬁcial impact of malicious players without their actual
presence? Our approach is to use a mediator. Informally, a mediator is a trusted
third party that suggests actions to each player. The players retain free will and
can ignore the mediator’s suggestions. The mediator proposes actions privately
to each player, but the algorithm the mediator uses to decide what to propose is
public knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a general technique for designing
mediators that is inspired by careful study of the “windfall of malice” eﬀect.
In our approach, the mediator makes a random choice of one of two possible
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conﬁgurations, where a conﬁguration is just a set of proposed actions for each
player. The ﬁrst conﬁguration is optimal: the mediator proposes a set of actions
that achieves the social optimum (or very close to it). The second conﬁguration is
“fear inducing”: the mediator proposes a set of actions that leads to catastrophic
failure for those players who do not heed the mediators advice. The purpose of
the second conﬁguration is to ensure that the players follow the advice of the
mediator when the optimal conﬁguration is chosen. Thus, the random choice of
which conﬁguration is chosen must be hidden from the players. We show the
applicability of our technique by using it to design a mediator for the virus
inoculation game from [7] that achieves a social welfare that is asymptotically
optimal.
We also show the limits of our technique by proving an impossibility result
that shows that for a large class of games, no mediator will improve the so-
cial welfare over the best Nash equilibrium. In particular, this impossibility re-
sult holds for the congestion games that in [4] is shown to have a windfall of
malice.
Related Work. The concept of a mediator is closely related to that of a cor-
related equilibrium, which was introduced by Aumann in [3]. In particular, if a
mediator proposes actions to the players such that it is in the best interest of
each player to follow the mediators proposal, then the mediator is said to im-
plement a correlated equilibrium. There are several recent results on correlated
equilibrium and mediators. The authors in [8] give polynomial time algorithms
that can optimize over correlated equilbria, via a LP approach, for a large class of
multiplayer games that are “succinctly representable” . Christodoulou et al. [6]
study the price of anarchy and stability in congestion games where each edge
has a linear cost function with positive coeﬃcients. They show that in such a
setting, the price of anarchy for pure equilibrium is almost the same as the price
of anarchy of correlated equilibrium. Balcan et al. [5], describe techniques for
moving from a high cost Nash equilibrium to a low cost Nash equilibrium via a
“public service advertising campaign”. They show that in many games, even if
not all players follow instructions, it is possible to ensure such a move . While
their result does not explicitly consider mediators, it is similar in ﬂavor to ours in
the sense that an outside third party is acting to improve social welfare. Recent
work by Abraham et al. [1] presents distributed algorithms that enable a group
of players to implement a mediator, entirely through point-to-point communica-
tion, even when there is a constant fraction of adversarial players.
Basic definitions and notation. A correlated equilibrium is a probability
distribution over strategy vectors that ensures that no player has incentive to
deviate. We deﬁne a configuration for a given game to be a vector of pure strate-
gies for that game, one for each player. We deﬁne a mediator for a game to be a
probability distribution D(C) over a ﬁnite set of diﬀerent conﬁgurations C. The
set of conﬁgurations C and the distribution D(C) are known to all players. How-
ever, the actual conﬁguration chosen is unknown, and the advice the mediator
gives to a particular player based on the chosen conﬁguration is known only to
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that player. We say that a mediator is valid if all players are incentivized to
follow its advice. In this case, the mediator implements a correlated equilibrium.
From a distributed computing viewpoint, the major diﬀerence between a cor-
related equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium is that in a correlated equilibrium,
players share a global coin, but in a Nash equilibrium, players only have access
to private coins.
Throughout this paper, we will only consider mediators that treat all players
equally, i.e., once having decided (by a random experiment according to D(C))
which is the conﬁguration the mediator is choosing from, all players have the
same probability to be proposed a particular strategy. Also, throughout the
paper we assume that the number of strategic players, n, is very large (tending
to inﬁnity). Finally, we will use the notation a(n) ∼ b(n) if a(n) = b(n)(1±o(1)).
We also use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
2 Virus Inoculation Game
We now describe the virus inoculation game from [2,7]. There are n players,
each corresponding to a node in a square grid G. Each player has two choices:
either to inoculate itself (at a cost of 1) or to do nothing and risk infection
(which costs L). After the decision of the nodes to inoculate or not, one node
selected uniformly at random is infected with a virus. A node v that chooses not
to inoculate gets infected by the virus if either the virus starts at v or the virus
starts at another node v′ and there is a path of not inoculated nodes connecting
v and v′.
The attack graph Ga is the graph induced on G by the set of all nodes that
do not inoculate. Aspnes et al. [2] proved that in a pure Nash equilibrium every
component of the attack graph has size n/L. The social welfare achieved in such
an equilibrium is thus Θ(n). Following Moscibroda et al. [7], we will focus on
outcomes of the game on the grid. It is proved there that the minimum social
welfare on the grid is Θ(n2/3L1/3), which occurs when the components in Ga
are of size (n/L)2/3. This implies that the cost of anarchy for this game is large
when L is large. However, Moscibroda et al. show that the existence of enough
Byzantine players, who can never be trusted to inoculate, ensures that the social
welfare of any Nash equilibrium is slightly better than Θ(n).
Based on the result from [7], we observe that the main problem in this game
is that the individual players do not have enough fear of being infected. In par-
ticular, they are unable to achieve the optimal social welfare because they form
connected components in Ga that are too large. Thus, we design a mediator
that randomly chooses between two conﬁgurations (see Figure 1). The ﬁrst con-
ﬁguration is optimal: all components in Ga are of size (n/L)2/3. The second
conﬁguration is “fear inducing”: any node that does not inoculate in this con-
ﬁguration has probability about 1/2 of being infected. The only purpose of the
second conﬁguration is to ensure that the selﬁsh players follow the advice of the
mediator when the optimal conﬁguration is chosen.
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We now formally describe the mediator for this game.1 The mediator will
choose randomly between one of the following two conﬁgurations C1 and C2.
Configuration C1: The mediator proposes a pattern of inoculation ensuring
that 1) each component in Ga is of size no more than (nL)
2/3; 2) each node is
advised to inoculate with equal probability; and 3) the probability that a ﬁxed
node is advised to inoculate is at most 2(L/n)1/3. It does this as follows.
1. The mediator chooses a random integer x uniformly in [0, (n/L)1/3 − 1].
2. For every node v in row r and column c, if one of the following two conditions
hold, the mediator proposes v to inoculate: 1) r ≡ x mod (n/L)1/3; or 2) c ≡ x
mod (n/L)1/3. Otherwise the mediator tells v not to inoculate.
Configuration C2: The mediator proposes a pattern of inoculation such that
1) all nodes that do not inoculate are in one giant component in Ga; 2) each
node has equal probability of being chosen to inoculate; and 3) the probability
that a ﬁxed node is advised to inoculate is 12 − 12√n . The mediator accomplishes
this in the following manner:
1. The mediator ﬂips a coin. If it comes up heads, it proposes that all nodes in
even columns do not inoculate. If it comes up tails, it proposes that all nodes in
odd columns do not inoculate.
2. The mediator chooses a random integer, x, uniformly in [1,
√
n]. For each
of the columns that have not already been told not to inoculate, the mediator
proposes that each node in that column inoculate except for the x-th node in
that column.
(n/L)1/3
√
n
C2 C1
Fig. 1. The
√
n×√n grid with conﬁgurations C1, C2
For these two conﬁgurations C1 and C2 we now deﬁne the probability distri-
bution D({C1, C2}) with p1 = (1− cL−2/3n−1/3) and p2 = cL−2/3n−1/3, where
c > 0 can be chosen to be any small constant satisfying c > 4L/(L − 2). The
following result shows that D({C1, C2}) is asymptotically optimal.
1 For ease of analysis, we assume that both
√
n and ( n
L
)1/3 are integers. Also,
√
n
should be an integer multiple of ( n
L
)1/3 (this assumption can be removed easily
without eﬀecting our asymptotic results).
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Theorem 1. D({C1, C2}) is a mediator with social welfare Θ(n2/3L1/3).
Proof. Deﬁne by EjI the event that the mediator advises player j to inoculate and
deﬁne by Ej
I¯
the event that the mediator advises player j not to inoculate. Since
all players are to be treated equally by the mediator, we omit j. Let EA be the
event that a node gets infected by the virus, and denote by CA the infection cost.
Denote by CI the cost of inoculation. We need to show that D({C1, C2}) yields a
mediator, i.e. that E [CA|EI ] ≥ E [CI |EI ] = 1 and E [CA|EI¯ ] ≤ E [CI |EI¯ ] = 1, which
is equivalent to showing that: (1) Pr (EA|EI) ≥ 1/L and (2) Pr (EA|EI¯) ≤ 1/L.
Let Ei, i = 1, 2, be the event that Ci, i = 1, 2 is chosen. To prove (1), observe
that
Pr (E1|EI) = Pr (E1, EI)/Pr (EI) ∼ p1(2(L/n)
1/3)
p1(2(L/n)1/3) + p2(1/2− 1/(2√n)) ,
and similarly for Pr (E2|EI). Now, plugging in the values of p1, p2 and using that
L ∈ o(n) we get2
Pr (EA|EI) = Pr (EA, E1|EI) + Pr (EA, E2|EI)
= Pr (EA|E1, EI)Pr (E1|EI) + Pr (EA|E2, EI)Pr (E2|EI)
∼ 2
L2/3n1/3
Pr (E1|EI) + 12Pr (E2|EI) ∼
c
2c + 4L
,
which is greater than 1/L for c > (4L)/(L− 2). Reasoning in a similar way we
get,
Pr (EA|EI¯) ∼
c + 2
2L2/3n1/3
,
which is smaller than 1/L since L ∈ o(n), so we proved (2). To compute
the social cost for this mediator, let I1 (I¯1) be the set of nodes that inoculate
(respectively do not inoculate) in C1, and let I2 (I¯2) be the set of nodes that
inoculate (respectively do not inoculate) in C2. Then the social cost for the
mediator can be written as
p1(|I1|+
∑
v∈I¯1
LPr (EA|E1, EI¯)) + p2(|I2|+
∑
v∈I¯2
LPr (EA|E2, EI¯)) ∼ Θ(n2/3L1/3).
3 Impossibility Result
In light of the results in the previous section, a natural question is: Is it pos-
sible to design a mediator that will always improve the social welfare in any
game for which there is a windfall of malice? Unfortunately, the answer to this
question is “No”, as we show in this section. In particular, we show that the
congestion games which Babaioﬀ, Kleinberg and Papadimitriou [4] have proven
have a windfall of malice eﬀect do not admit a mediator that is able to improve
the social welfare. In fact, we prove a stronger impossibility result, showing that
2 If L = θ(n), then any pure Nash equilibrium is trivially asymptotically optimal.
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for any non-atomic, symmetric congestion game where the cost of a path never
decreases as a function of the ﬂow through that path (of which class of games,
the examples in [4] are special instances), no mediator can improve the social
optimum.
A non-atomic, symmetric congestion game (henceforth, simply a congestion
game) is a speciﬁed by a set of n → ∞ players; a set of E facilities (or edges);
A ⊂ 2E actions (or paths); and ﬁnally, for each facility e a cost function fe
associated with that facility. A pure strategy proﬁle A = (A1, . . . , An) is a vector
of actions, one for each player. The cost of player i for action proﬁle A is given by
Fi(A) =
∑
e∈Ai fe(xe(A)) where xe(A) is the fraction of players using e in A. As
in [4], we assume that the game is non-atomic: since n →∞ the contribution of
a single player to the ﬂow over a facility is negligible; and symmetric: all players
have the same cost functions.
For an action a and a ﬂow x ∈ [0, 1], let Fh(a, x) be the maximum possible
cost of following action a when the total fraction of players following this action
is x, where the maximum is taken over all ways that the remaining ﬂow of 1−x
can be distributed over other actions. Similarly, let F(a, x) be the minimum
cost of following action a when the total fraction of players following this action
is x.
The following theorem says that for congestion games where the cost function
of every action is non-decreasing in the fraction of players performing that action,
the coordination between the agents in order to establish a correlated equilibrium
will not decrease the social cost.
Theorem 2. Consider a non-atomic, anonymous congestion game. If for all
a ∈ A and 0 ≤ x ≤ x′ ≤ 1, Fh(a, x) ≤ F(a, x′) then the smallest social
cost achieved by a correlated equilibrium is no less than the smallest social cost
achieved by a Nash equilibrium.
We next give a high level sketch of how we prove this theorem. We will ﬁx a non-
atomic, anonymous congestion game G with q actions, a1, . . . , aq, and n players.
We deﬁne a configuration, C, for such a game to be a partitioning of the set of
players across the q actions. We note that the number of possible conﬁgurations
is ﬁnite; in particular, qn. We next ﬁx a mediator, M , for this game. We assume
the mediator uses  diﬀerent conﬁgurations C1, . . . , C; that 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1 is
the fraction of the players in conﬁguration Cj assigned to action ai; and that
ci,j ∈ R is the cost in conﬁguration Cj for action ai. We further assume that for
all j ∈ [], pj is the probability with which the mediator M chooses Cj .
For any two actions a, a′ we deﬁne the a posteriori cost of a given a′ as the
expected cost for a player of performing action a when action a′ is suggested
by the mediator M ; formally, POST(a, a′) = E [Ca|Ea′ ], where Ca is a random
variable (over the conﬁguration chosen by the mediator) and Ea′ is the event
that action a′ is recommended by the mediator. We deﬁne the a priori cost of
action a as the cost of a player completely ignoring what the mediator suggests
and always performing action a; formally, PRI (a) :=
∑
j=1 pjci,j .
The sketch behind our proof for this theorem is as follows. First, we show
in Lemma 1 that for all actions a, if the cost of a is non-decreasing in the ﬂow
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through a, then POST(a, a) ≥ PRI (a). This is done by repeated decompositions
of terms in summations for the a priori and posterior costs. Next, let Y be the
cost of a player following the advice of the mediator, and let X be the cost of the
player if she ignores the advice of the mediator and always chooses the action a
that minimized PRI (a). In Lemma 2 we show that E(Y ) ≤ E(X). This lemma
is shown by summing up inequality constraints on the mediator. Finally, we use
these two lemmas to show the main theorem by showing that if Lemma 1 holds,
then E(Y ) > E(X). The main technical challenge is the fact that we must show
that E(Y ) > E(X) even though Lemma 1 does not necessarily give a strict
inequality. We address this problem by a subtle case analysis in the proof of the
main theorem, and by augmenting Lemma 1 to show that in some cases, the
inequality it implies is strict.
We now sketch the main points and defer the full proof to the full version
of our paper. Observe that the condition for all a ∈ A and 0 ≤ x ≤ x′ ≤ 1,
Fh(a, x) ≤ F(a, x′) implies that for all i ∈ [m], ∀j, k ∈ [] we have that xij ≤ xik
implies cij ≤ cik, and so the conditions of the following lemma are satisﬁed.
Lemma 1. Given  ≥ 2 configurations C1, . . . , C, with corresponding probabil-
ities pr > 0, r ∈ []. If for i ∈ [m], ∀j, k ∈ [] we have that xij ≤ xik implies
cij ≤ cik, then POST (ai, ai) ≥ PRI (ai). Moreover, if for any i ∈ [q], not all cij,
j ∈ [] are the same, then POST (ai, ai) > PRI (ai).
Deﬁne by apri := argminaPRI (a). Given a mediator over a ﬁxed set of con-
ﬁgurations, let X be the random variable denoting the cost of an arbitrary
player when he decides to use action apri, i.e., E [X ] =
∑
j=1 pjcaprij . Let Y be
a random giving the cost of a player that follows the advice of the mediator,
i.e., E [Y ] =
∑m
i=1 POST(ai, ai)Pr (Ei) =
∑m
i=1
∑
j=1 pjxijcij . In the following
lemma we give the relationship between Y and X . The proof is based on sum-
ming the q−1 inequalities resulting from constraints for a correlated equilibrium,
and again it is deferred to the full version.
Lemma 2. For any mediator we have E [Y ] ≤ E [X ].
To prove the main theorem, denote by apost := argminsPOST(s, s) the action
with minimum a posteriori cost. We will consider two cases.
Case 1: Not all actions have the same a posteriori cost. Using Lemma 2.2:
E [Y ] > POST(apost, apost) ≥ PRI (apri) = E [X ].
Case 2: All actions have the same a posteriori cost. Assume it is not true that
there is an action that does not have equal costs in each conﬁguration. Then
the cost of each action is the same in every conﬁguration, and so any particular
conﬁguration must be a Nash equilibrium that achieves social cost equal to the
social cost of the correlated equilibrium. Thus, we let ax be some action that
does not have the same cost in all conﬁgurations. Then using Lemma 3.2:
E [Y ] = POST(ax, ax) ≥ PRI (apri) = E [X ].
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In both cases we have E [Y ] > E [X ]. This however contradicts Lemma 2, hence
there can not exist a correlated equilibrium achieving social cost less than the
optimal Nash equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that a mediator can improve the social welfare in some strategic
games with a positive windfall of malice. Several open questions remain including
the following. First, can we determine necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a
game to allow a mediator that improves social welfare over the best Nash? In
particular, can we ﬁnd such conditions for general congestion games? What
about arbitrary anonymous games? Second, for games where each player can
choose among k actions, can we say how many conﬁgurations are needed by any
mediator? Preliminary work in this direction shows that for 2 actions, sometimes
more than 2 conﬁgurations are needed. Finally, can we use approaches similar
to those in this paper for designing mediators for multi-round games? We have
already made some preliminary progress in this direction for multi-round games
where the number of rounds is determined by a geometric random variable.
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